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# THE EMPEROR WHO MADE WAR

BY DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER

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ALTHOUGH it is the general belief that Francis Joseph only came to the plenitude of his popularity in the latter half of his long reign, this is not in accordance with the facts, for from the day that he entered Vienna, a youthful, gallant figure riding through crowded streets in which the din of civil strife and battle had only just been stilled, to bring his people a new constitution, he held a very special place in their hearts. The storms of 1848 had brought Austria face to face with dismemberment. They had wrecked the Metternich system, and they had threatened not merely to terminate the reign of Ferdinand, but to subvert his dynasty as well. But the excesses of the Viennese mob and of Hungarian rebels produced a reaction. With Ferdinand's abdication in December, 1848, disloyalty disappeared. The natural attachment of the Austrians to the ruling family revived, and it was amidst scenes of indescribable emotion and enthusiasm that his nephew, Francis Joseph, assumed at eighteen years of age the responsibility of governing the most heterogeneous empire in Europe. He was practically unknown, but his handsome face and gallant bearing won the spontaneous support of his subjects, and on all sides faith was proclaimed in the new era. Seventy years more or less of wise rule have justified that faith.

It is not easy to bring before the reader's mind the state of popular commotion that prevailed in Austria-Hungary at that period, or the chaos to which the rival pretensions of Magyar and Slav, Croat and Czech, had brought the administration; but a few facts will be useful for reference and elucidation. The primary cause of the trouble was the dissatisfaction of Hungary with its position in the Empire. Hungary regarded itself as an independent kingdom possessing its own constitution and joined to Austria by its own free will. The Hapsburg ruler was King of Hungary,

and Hungary had been a free party to the Pragmatic Sanction in 1723 on that basis. The Empress Maria Theresa had been crowned "King" amid enthusiastic cries of "*moriemur pro nostro rege, Maria Teresa!*". But her successors had unwisely departed from her example, the separate coronation was not repeated, and Austria displayed an increasing intention to treat Hungary not as an allied kingdom, but as a dependent province. In Vienna, at least among the governing circles, the only conception of government was the Emperor's will and unswerving obedience to the laws of the Church of Rome. While the Austrian capital was swathed in the bonds of Absolutism the Hungarian was full of agitation for the modernizing of the old constitution.

It had taken a novel form. From time immemorial the classic and official language of Hungary had been Latin. The speeches in the Diet were delivered in Latin; it was in Latin that the oath was taken to the King. A resolution was suddenly formed to remove this anachronism. The Diet passed a law that Latin was to give place to Magyar, but the Hungarian magnates had not taken into account the Slavs who formed the majority of the population in the trans-Leithan kingdom. The Slavs and Croats were willing enough to talk in Latin, an acquired language, but they would have nothing to do with Magyar. "*Nolumus Magyarisari!*" became their battle cry, and in the crisis of 1848 it was Croat and Slav loyalty that preserved the Hapsburgs against Hungarian disaffection. When the Hungarians revolted in March-April, 1848, the Croats, under their Ban Jellachich, marched to the Leitha to defend the approaches to the capital.

It was amid these scenes of internal commotion that Francis Joseph took up the heavy task of government with which he has grappled for more than sixty years. The circumstances of the hour were not favorable to good relations with Hungary. That country was in open insurrection and had repudiated the authority of the Hapsburgs. It was only brought back to a state of obedience by the intervention of Russia, which sent an army across the Carpathians in the interests of what was euphemistically called general order. For the first twenty years of the Emperor's reign the name of Hungary was taboo in Viennese circles, and there was no reason for thinking that Francis Joseph

had different views about that country than those held by the people around him. In his first reforms, then, Hungary had no place. It was to Austria alone that he addressed his first proposals. They were rendered remarkable by the fact that they were issued on his own initiative. A committee had been sitting at Kremsier for some months in solemn deliberation on the different forms of constitution that might be suitable, but there was no sign of any result being forthcoming when early in March, 1849, the Emperor took the matter into his own hands and promulgated his own constitution. Its terms were not so very liberal, but it was none the less the death warrant of the old autocratic principle and it was the Emperor's own act.

The young Emperor's advent to power was marked by external as well as internal complications. In Italy the Milanese seemed lost till the genius of the aged Radetzky turned the scale in favor of the Austrians. In Germany itself Prussia had been watching with unconcealed satisfaction the troubles of her southern neighbor which promised to facilitate the transfer of the leading influence in Germany from Vienna to Berlin. But her time had not come yet, and for a moment it seemed that despite his domestic troubles Francis Joseph would be accepted as the true German leader. All the German rulers lived in fear of revolution, and Austria had thrown herself into the breach and arrested its progress. When the Elector of Hesse got into trouble with his subjects it was to Austria he appealed against Prussia's coquetting with his rebels, and Austria with the assurance of Russia's support presented for the last time an ultimatum at Berlin. Prussia gave way and accepted the terms of the Convention of Olmutz. But this triumph was brief, for all Austria's efforts to obtain recognition from the Frankfort Diet for her non-German elements were successfully defeated by the efforts of Prussia. Nor was this all, for the dangerous principle received general acceptance that no German Prince could rule non-German subjects save by a personal title, and it was also insisted upon as a natural corollary that it was the first duty of a German Prince to Germanize his subjects. Herein lay the secret of all Austria's trouble. A so-called German ruler with subjects of whom three-fourths were non-Germans found himself in a strange dilemma.

Two personal as distinct from political incidents of this

early period claim our notice. In 1853 the life and reign of Francis Joseph were almost cut short by the knife of a journeyman tailor named Janos Libeny, who, watching his opportunity, sprang out on the Emperor from a recess whilst taking a walk on the old ramparts of Vienna. The Emperor owed his escape to the stoutness of his collar and to the energy displayed by his companion, Count O'Donnell, who seized the assassin and held him until help arrived. Describing the occurrence to a relative, the Emperor said, briefly, "O'Donnell saved my life." It was not the first nor the last occasion on which the representative of an exiled Irish family had the opportunity of displaying his loyalty to the Hapsburgs. To the end of his life the Emperor will show the trace of the wound in a slight droop of one of the eyelids.

It was soon after this incident that the question of the Emperor's marriage began to attract attention, and it was not unnatural that an alliance with the House of Bavaria, the only ruling family in Germany which could rank in antiquity with that of Austria, should suggest itself as the most appropriate. There were several eligible princesses—the daughters of the Duke Max and the Duchess Louise. Their beauty and grace had become matters of general talk; two of them had made their *début* in court life at Munich. It was decided, so far as the acts of a free man can be determined, that in one of these Francis Joseph should find his partner and Empress. The tale has often been told how the young Emperor went to choose his bride, and how in the midst of his conversation a radiant and high-spirited girl not out of her teens burst into the salon and eclipsed her sisters. The Emperor had seen his fate; he came away and sent in his formal application for the hand, not of either of the young ladies who had entertained him, but for the young Princess Elizabeth who had gained his heart. Old Viennese still tell with tears in their eyes how the girl-bride was welcomed by her lover when she came to be married in the Hofburg of Vienna. The Emperor lifted her out of the carriage, and, placing her arm under his, led her into the palace, of which for thirty years till the dark shadow of Meyerling fell across their paths she was to be the bright and central star.

Neither the imminence of personal danger nor the distractions of domestic felicity gained for Francis Joseph any respite from his troubles. The Crimean War, which at a

cursory glance seemed only a struggle between Russia and the Western Powers, provided a crisis for Austria. She was under a deep obligation to the Czar for his aid against Hungarians and Prussia. But the menace to the integrity of the Ottoman dominions aroused anxiety at Vienna, and, as Schwarzenberg predicted, "Austria astonished the world by her ingratitude" to Russia. She took the Danubian principalities under her protection. After the war had continued for some time she exerted all the pressure she could at St. Petersburg to secure peace, and she succeeded in her object by allowing Russia to see that if the war went on she would take the field against her. Austria was ungrateful, and if the general peace of Europe gained it is very doubtful whether from the strictly Austrian point of view the policy was wise. It broke up the Holy Alliance, or, rather, the survival of it in the Austro-Russian league, and it left Austria without a supporter in 1859 and 1866. If Russia wanted to see her neighbor punished for her ingratitude she could not have prescribed a more severe chastisement than fate reserved for her.

There is no need to dwell here on the details of the Italian war. Its chief and most durable influence was as part of that chastening experience which not merely molded the character of the young Emperor, but which involved his country in the throes not of dissolution, but of a new birth. The retreat of the Austrian armies across the plains of Lombardy, after a series of sanguinary reverses at the hands of the French army, was witnessed by the Emperor in person, who endeavored to inspire his lieutenants by his presence; but military genius cannot be made to order, and on this occasion the Austrian plan of campaign was as badly conceived as in the worst days of the Aulic Council. The sight of the Austrian wounded after Solferino caused the Emperor the deepest grief and disgusted him with war, a sentiment which became intensified with the lapse of time.

But unfortunately for her future, Austrian diplomacy was no better than her strategy. The Italian possessions had always been a source of weakness to Austria. As far back as the treaty of Utrecht, Prince Eugene had urged on the Court of Vienna to drop them and to concentrate its efforts on the development of the Netherlands. Another chance of ending the fatal entanglement presented itself in 1859 when Italy offered to buy back Venetia. The retention of

the famous Quadrilateral counted for more than the sacrifice based on the exercise of common sense which would have averted the deep humiliation seven years later. The treaty of Villafranca left Austria beaten; Italy unsatisfied and ripe to be the ally of Prussia in the great duel for the first place in Germany.

Peace restored, Francis Joseph again took up the question of internal reform and with the more earnestness, because he had lost faith in his ministers. During the war some of the Czech regiments had displayed what may be called a halting loyalty, and in Bohemia the peasants joined in a sort of refrain: "If we are beaten we shall get a constitution, but if we win we shall never have one." The Emperor did not delay in proving them right. In 1860 he not merely enlarged with new powers the archaic State Council, but he intrusted the portfolio of chief minister to Count Goluchowski, a Pole. This was the first occasion on which he resorted to the plan he chiefly favored in later years of choosing his principal advisers from one of the other races instead of among Austrians or Magyars. But the readjustment of administrative powers in 1860 was only the precursor of the new constitution proclaimed in the next year. By an Imperial decree two chambers were created, and for the first time the government was framed on liberal lines and with the acceptance of ministerial responsibility.

But large as were the concessions made, they were accompanied by certain conditions and qualifications which greatly diminished their effect on the public and detracted from their value. For instance, the apportionment of seats to the electorate largely favored the German element at the expense of the rest. The Chamber of Representatives was to contain 343 members, of whom 85 were to be elected in Hungary, and it was considered that the system had been so manipulated as to give the German minority a preponderance of seats over the joint Slav-Magyar constituencies. No one could have imagined that Hungary would rejoice at the gift sought to be forced upon her, but the Austrian public was unprepared for the vehemence with which it was rejected. The Hungarians declared that they already possessed a constitution of their own and that they would not accept the new one. They refused to elect representatives, and some of the more extreme leaders reminded the Em-

peror that, as he had not been crowned their King, disobedience to his orders would not amount to high treason.

A new crisis was thus sprung upon the country. The Hungarians would not send deputies to Vienna, the Austrians in return suppressed the Hungarian Diet, and the trans-Leithan kingdom passed under the rigorous régime of martial law. But after a little of this commotion and after watching the development of the strife of the nationalities in what he loved, despite appearances, to term his "united and undivided Empire," Francis Joseph stepped into the breach himself. He dismissed his Chancellor, Schmerling, who had shown a bitterly anti-Hungarian spirit, and, to the astonishment of his German subjects, he went to Pesth in person to arrange terms with his Magyar lieges. This event occurred in 1865 and was followed by an extraordinary revival of loyalty among the Hungarians to the throne. Francis Joseph had touched the chord in their hearts which Maria Theresa had been the last to sound. The Emperor's visit did not in itself solve a grave political difficulty, but it opened the door to a new prospect.

Once again the question of internal reform was interrupted and had to be laid aside by the occurrence of a serious external difficulty culminating in war. The rivalry of Austria and Prussia for the lead in Germany, which may be said to have begun in the Seven Years' War, had gone on in one form or other for the better part of a century. The assumption at Vienna was that Prussia would never succeed in accomplishing what was regarded as a piece of presumptuousness, and there was at least one solid justification for this view in the fact that Austria possessed the sympathy of most of the minor German powers. Yet the fact that it was only Russia's support that averted war at Olmütz ought to have been remembered. In 1861 Prussia passed under a new king and a new minister. The period of blood and iron had arrived.

In 1863 Francis Joseph summoned the German princes to a diet at Frankfort, and all accepted with the exception of Prussia. Various changes in form were to be discussed, but it was well known that Francis Joseph had larger designs and a more ambitious programme. The old Empire of Germany—derived from the Empire of the west and Charlemagne—had disappeared after Austerlitz, but it was hoped that the German Diet would by a new decree recognize



the House of Hapsburg as possessing a right to preside over its meetings in perpetuity. There is no doubt that the majority of the smaller German states would have passed such a vote, but Prussia, by astutely refusing to be present, reduced the proceedings of the Diet to a nullity. Francis Joseph went out of his way to meet King William and to invite him personally to attend, but there was a strong will behind the Hohenzollern, and Bismarck declared with cynical frankness, in words which should always be treasured:

“The principle always followed in the Prussian monarchy demands that resolutions be not taken in a completed plan concerning the interests of the State except after a thorough examination of all possibilities by His Majesty.”

The Frankfort Diet held its meeting and Francis Joseph made an excellent speech on his plan of reform, but so far as the relations of Austria and Prussia went it was barren. It was at this point that Francis Joseph made one of the great mistakes of his life. He allowed himself to be drawn into the war with Denmark, and he thus destroyed the best chance he ever had of curbing Prussian ambition by arraying against it England and France. It is no historical secret that even against Prussia and Austria combined those two powers were on the point of intervening, and the declaration of the British Government stands on record that it would always regard the war over Schleswig-Holstein as an unnecessary one. If Austria had refused to join Prussia in the most brutal act of force that Europe had witnessed since the partition of Poland, Bismarck's plans would have been balked at the start. The petty sentiments of the Frankfort Diet—a medieval court swayed by prejudices of the most exclusive nature—prevailed over the larger considerations of statecraft that should have guided the policy of Austria.

The Danish war ended and the usefulness of Austria to Prussia for the accomplishment of Bismarck's designs having disappeared, it was only to be expected that bickerings should ensue between the late partners over the plunder. Austria took Holstein; Prussia, Schleswig. The latter offered to pay twelve millions for the former duchy, and once more, as in Venetia, Austria haughtily rejected a profitable money transaction. In the end she lost it without recompense, and the money she refused was devoted by Bismarck to the object of equipping Italy for war. In June, 1866,

Francis Joseph found himself involved in a struggle with his two neighbors, one claiming the lead in Germany, the other the recovery of Venetia for a reunited Italy.

This essay would have to run to the size of a volume if any attempt were made to describe the six weeks' war. The Austrian army, despite the fact that it had only the old muzzle-loader as against the needle-gun, never fought better than it did on the field of Sadowa, and with a little superior judgment in the strategy of the campaign the result might have been different. In Italy it defeated Victor Emanuel's troops at Custozza, and the young Austrian navy gained an imperishable renown at Lissa. But on the main scene of conflict the God of Battles had pronounced his award, and Francis Joseph decided with admirable promptitude to make all the sacrifices to obtain immediate peace. He gave up Venetia to France for transfer to Italy; he assented to the exclusion of Austria from the German Diet, which was reconstituted as the North German Confederation under the leading of Prussia. For fifteen years Francis Joseph had striven, not without hope of success, for that lead himself, and now he had to resign it without chance of recovery. It was a bitter pill to swallow, but if Austrian statesmen had then and there decided that, excluded from Germany, their country should also cease to be a German power, the future might have held some compensation.

If it was mainly due to the Emperor's influence that peace was so promptly made, the impression of this sanguinary struggle, completing that of 1859, on the Emperor's mind was to increase his horror of war. In a military state the head of the country cannot pronounce himself against the army, but Francis Joseph resolved that so far as he could help it there should be no more wars for his people in his time. He succeeded in giving his country over forty-five years of unbroken peace, and on several occasions, as everybody knew, war was only averted by his personal intervention and fixed determination.

After Villafranca, Francis Joseph had turned to internal reforms; after the treaty of Prague, to do so was still more politic. In 1865 he had visited Pesth and raised Hungarian hopes; the time had come to justify them. For the purpose the Emperor took into his service the Saxon minister, Count Beust, who had always been a good friend to Austria. Beust was convinced that the only way to save the

Austrian Empire was to settle all difficulties with the Magyars. The same year that was marked in red characters by Sadowa witnessed the signing of the Ausgleich by which Hungary came into repossession of her ancient and never-abandoned rights. Hungary was recognized as a separate kingdom, a Hungarian ministry was created, and the Emperor of Austria proceeded to Pesth to be crowned King of Hungary. It was then that the dual state of Austria-Hungary was born.

But the concession to the Magyars had only stimulated the other races to demand national and autonomic rights, and among the other races the Czechs of Bohemia were not less vehement and formidable than the Magyars of Hungary. But the Czechs were the more exasperating critics of the upholders of the *status quo*, because they wanted an enlarged Bohemian kingdom which would include large districts under Prussian authority. Their ambition led them to play with the idea of joining hands with either France or Russia, and thus they were disloyal, at least in their thoughts, by looking for aid beyond the common frontier. But as the greater Bohemia was an idle dream, so, too, were the proposed measures for attaining it. The Czechs refused to recognize the Austrian Parliament or to send deputies to it and for a time Bohemia was administered by martial law. The triumph of Prussia in the war with France exercised a calming influence in Bohemia, for it ended the prospect of external aid from the most hopeful quarter.

This moment was adroitly seized by the Emperor and the new principle of federalism was adopted in the teeth of the opposition of the German members of the Reichsrath. In 1871 the Bohemians were given the promise of their separate Diet at Prague, and Francis Joseph declared his readiness to inaugurate the new constitution by a fresh coronation. But unfortunately the forces arrayed against the scheme were too strong and it could not be carried out, yet the principle of federalism became the motive force in the dual state. The Emperor felt deeply his inability to fulfil his promise; his minister resigned; but one of the main reasons for his subsequent support of Count Taaffe, a Bohemian nobleman of Irish descent, was his conviction that he would discover some way of propitiating Czech opinion. In this hope he was not disappointed. The Czechs, deprived of their own constitution, would not send deputies to the

Reichsrath. This left the German element supreme in that assembly, and no ministry could retain office if it failed to please that party. But in 1881 Taaffe succeeded in inducing them to adopt a more reasonable attitude. The deputies were elected to restore the balance of parties in the Reichsrath at Vienna, several prominent Czechs were admitted into the cabinet, and the long-disputed Prague University question was settled by the Czech and German languages being placed on an equal footing. For the first time the people of Bohemia had some reason to think that Austrian policy approximated to the ideal laid down by Francis II.: "*Justitia ergo omnes nationes est fundamentum Austriæ.*" The old ideal of a distinct Bohemian kingdom remains a living hope, but it is no longer associated with any desire for separation from Austria.

In Galicia it was easier to gain adhesion for federalism because there was no claim of separate sovereignty or inherited constitution to be brought into the opposite scale. The Austrian Poles were happy and lightly treated in comparison with their kinsmen under Prussia and Russia. Indeed, it was one of the ironies of history that at the moment when Gladstone denounced Austria as having done no good anywhere the Germans were complaining of her indulgence toward her Polish subjects. Federalism also gained popular sanction in the minor provinces or divisions of the Empire, each of which possesses its own Diet and also sends representatives to either the Austrian or the Hungarian Reichsrath. Whatever critics of Austrian stability may say to the contrary, federalism, for the inception of which the whole credit belongs to Francis Joseph, has solved the worst of Austria's internal difficulties. The parliamentary troubles relating to the use of the guillotine, the reconciling of free debate with the progress of the practical work of an administration, which are more or less common to all legislatures at the present time, are not to be magnified into the serious national dangers that confronted Francis Joseph at his accession and that were aggravated by two disastrous wars. Even the language question in the army is not of that profound and disintegrating nature. From one point of view it is a final effort by the German element to retain the old German privileges; from another it is merely a question of detail which could easily be manipulated with a little mutual goodwill and good temper.

The great and distinctive change wrought in the Austrian Empire between the time of Francis Joseph's accession and the present time is that he found it a purely German power, and he leaves it one in which the German influence has sunk to a force of the second order. If a simple test of the truth of this statement were required it would be found in the fact that since Beust his principal ministers and advisers were Magyars, Poles, and Czechs. Indeed, but for two facts—the uniformity of the German language in the army and the close alliance with Prussia—it might be plausibly contended that Austria-Hungary was no longer a German power. Francis Joseph had the wisdom to allow this tendency to develop and to leave events to shape themselves. Only a violent effort, on the part of the Pan-Germans, utilizing Court and Church influences for their own ends to arrest or divert the natural course of affairs, would revive the racial peril in its original grave form. But whether successful or not, in the end it is clear that the attempt would produce a long and bitter struggle during which the value of Austria as an ally would be seriously diminished for Prussian purposes. The Pan-Germans, therefore, are not likely to receive much outside encouragement to carry on a vigorous propaganda until the hegemony of Prussia and its satellites is placed on a much securer basis than it is at present. In 1866 the victorious Bismarck excluded Austria from Germany. A waning of German influence on the Danube has necessarily followed, and the process cannot be arrested, although for many years the international situation and a formal alliance will compel Austria and north Germany to act together. The un-Germanizing of Austria has none the less been in steady and unarrested progress for nearly half a century.

But if the growth of racial equality is a feature of the reign of Francis Joseph, that of individual liberty is still more remarkable. In 1848 the Austrian subject of all states was amenable to a law that belonged to the Middle Ages. Maximilian and Charles V. would have seen in it their own handiwork. Cardinal Granville would have pronounced it strictly orthodox, but the reasons that can be pleaded against Motley's strictures on the sixteenth century do not apply to the nineteenth. Ferdinand's system was an anachronism. Francis Joseph gradually cut away from it the privileges and the prejudices of Church and caste. All

traces of feudalism have gone. The noble has the same obligations as the peasant. The tiller of the ground is no longer a vassal. In the courts all are equal, cases must be heard in public, the right of appeal is admitted, torture has been abolished, corporal punishment is no longer inflicted in the army. In social relations Church law has been displaced by that of the state. The civil, not the religious, authorities grant divorce. The admission of the Jews—that great people who have neither dynasty nor constitution to hold them together, and yet who set an edifying example of union to the whole world—to an equal position as men with Christians provided the final proof that Austria had shaken off the bondage of an age gone never to return. Some critic has said that liberty in Austria is not perfect or complete because of the police supervision; but the same thing exists not merely in north Germany, but in Belgium, which is, in my opinion, a country where individual liberty stands higher than in England. All states are mainly composed of honest people who have nothing to fear from reasonable police supervision.

But there is another molding and creative process through which Austria has been passing—more especially in the last thirty years—that has exercised on what we may call home questions a moderating influence which was not dreamed of by the elder Kossuth and the other fiery minds of 1848. This is nothing more or less than the growth of prosperity and of what is known as material comfort. In 1848 Austria and its dependent states formed a poor country, backward in all the essentials of national well-being. The proletariat was badly fed, badly housed, a beast of burden not indeed driven by a Russian knout, for in Austria the national character in high and low has always possessed a kind of *bonhomie* which has arrested official severity on the brink of tyranny, but still not at liberty. There was no commercial class, such industry as went on was restricted to the petty home kind of the handicraftsmen, and capital was to all intents and purposes non-existent.

Sixty years have produced a complete revolution. The Austro-Hungarian Government, instead of having to deal with a revenue of about twelve millions sterling as in 1848, and with a budget always in deficit, now ranks with those that attain the hundred millions, and if the aid of the market is often needed, that is an operation to which in some form

or other even Anglo-Saxon institutions have to condescend. But the most remarkable development of all has taken place in respect of the development of the natural resources of the country. In agricultural and mineral wealth it not only stands to-day in the first rank of European countries, but it is the one which, Russia excepted, holds forth the most brilliant future prospects. It produces all the minerals from gold to lead, and there are extensive proved but unworked coal-fields which only require the necessary capital to exploit them. The visible but unexploited mineral wealth of the country is beyond estimation and little realized outside Vienna. It justifies the belief that the progress of the last fifty years will be far exceeded in the course of the half-century that is to come.

Another question has been placed on the way to solution; this is the improvement of internal communications. In 1848 they were of the most primitive order, and some of the provinces were as completely cut off from the capital as if they were in China. Under Francis Joseph's guidance the two states have been endowed with a network of railways, and the Government has even felt rich enough to indulge in the luxury of making some railways for no other than strategical considerations. But the bulk of them can justify their existence on material grounds, and as a whole the railways pay the state a handsome surplus. Internal navigation has also been developed, and that magnificent river, the Danube, carries along a total in transport and traffic which entitles it to vie with the Rhine. While Austria by explosion and cutting has made a navigable channel at the Iron Gates and thus gained access to the Black Sea, she has also laid the basis of commercial and naval power in her ports on the Adriatic. Trieste is a successful rival to Venice; Pola and Fiume are among the chief naval stations of the Mediterranean; and if a nation ever dreams of the future, Austrians may be excused for thinking of Salonica. Finally, Austria is making enormous strides in population. Sixty years ago the Empire had less than half the population of France; to-day it contains thirteen million more people. France is stationary; the dual state adds three-quarters of a million of new subjects to its total population each year. The growth and development of the country in the time of Francis Joseph would provide a wide and fruitful field for interesting and instructive research if it

could be explored without the old prejudice and seemingly ineradicable conviction that Austria-Hungary possesses no stable and assured existence.

That doubt brings us to one of our closing points—Francis Joseph's personal influence on the external policy of his Empire. For the first eighteen years of his reign his foreign policy was the one he had inherited. For over one hundred years the dominant sentiment in high circles in Vienna had been distrust of Prussia, and he showed that he shared it. Events justified it and the only ground for censure would lie in Austria's neglect to provide against them. In addition to his views about Prussia, Francis Joseph had the desire common to every one to retain what he possessed—hence his tenacity in clinging to so much of northern Italy. We have seen how he lost the Italian provinces and the first place, or even the claim to it, in Germany. But a few words are required as to the effect produced by those humiliations on the mind of Francis Joseph and through it on Austria's policy.

After Sadowa two courses lay at the choice of Francis Joseph. He might quite naturally have allowed his memories to rankle and devoted himself to the task of preparing for his revenge. He would have replaced the muzzle-loader in the hands of his soldiers with a breech-loader as quickly as possible, he would have armed the Czech people, which he had refused to do in 1866, and finally he would have entered into an alliance with France. He did none of these things, not because they were not suggested to him, but because he rejected altogether the old policy of jealousy, rancor, and rivalry toward Prussia. These sentiments are even now far from being dead in some Austrian circles, but Francis Joseph stifled them in his own breast after the peace of Prague. The whole truth about the pseudo negotiations of 1870 has not yet been given to the world, and whatever certain Austrian ministers may have said or promised to French representatives, it is indisputable that when words had to be translated into acts Francis Joseph would have imposed his veto.

Francis Joseph had done with the past. His visit to Berlin in 1872 to meet the Emperor of Russia was in itself a revelation of timidity, as if protection might be found in the association of three Emperors against the avidity of any one of them. The Emperors' league was a very



good arrangement for fair weather, but it could not hinder the natural march of events or prevent political problems from reaching a critical phase.

In 1876 the Eastern question became once more acute, and in the following year war broke out between Russia and Turkey. Austria took steps to safeguard her interests in the lower Danube, and Russia gave assurances at Vienna that her troops would not enter Servia. When the Russians were stopped at Plevna they suggested that they might send a force through Servian territory, but Austria did not accede to the request, and when the treaty of peace was made she occupied Herzegovina and Bosnia with a force of 200,000 men and 450 guns. It is true that for this step she obtained a European mandate, but none the less it was a vigorous assertion of Austria's right to take action beyond her frontiers. The step was judicious as well as vigorous. It was not, as many critics thought, to prove a drain on Austria's strength; it was destined to add a new nationality to the "United Men" under the Hapsburg throne. Thirty years after this temporary occupation in the interests of Europe Herzegovina-Bosnia had become contented and assured members of the Austrian federation.

It is, therefore, clear that, despite his desire for peace and his unswerving personal resolve to do everything in his power to maintain it, the Emperor Francis Joseph has been more than once confronted with the prospect that he might have to draw the sword. It is the inevitable accompaniment of having a foreign policy at all that a ruler or Government must be prepared to support what is done with strong measures. Yet the Emperor's well-known aversion to war and horror of its consequences long counted for much in the maintenance of peace. It deterred his own ministers from forcing war-like counsels on him, and it provided a moral support for those who pleaded for the gentler way. Nor was this the end or limit of his pacific influence. The conviction that Francis Joseph favored peace under almost any circumstances produced a corresponding sentiment in other capitals, and in some we do not doubt that there grew up a desire that the closing years of the august peace advocate should not be pained by the horrid din of war. That hope has not been realized; let the believers in universal peace take warning.

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